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Conspiracy Theories and the
Study of Alternative and
Emergent Religions
David G. Robertson, Guest Editor
ABSTRACT: This introduction addresses a number of approaches to the
emerging field of the study of conspiracy theories and new and alter-
native religions. Scholars can examine how certain religious groups have
been the subject of conspiracy narratives created by the wider culture,
and how conspiracy narratives are mobilized within religious groups such
as Aum Shinrikyo, Scientology or others. Moreover, we can fruitfully
examine secular conspiracy theories through ideas typically applied to
religions, such as theodicy, millenarianism, and esoteric claims to higher
knowledge. Most studies assume that conspiracy theories indicate
pathology—paranoia or simply stupidity. Increasingly however, scholars
have begun to interpret the term ‘‘conspiracy theory’’ as operating
polemically to stigmatize certain beliefs and ideas. The field therefore
offers a microcosm of broader trends in the interplay of knowledge and
power. The study of both new and emergent religions and conspiracy
theories comes of age only when we cease to think of them as necessarily
deviant and irrational.
KEYWORDS: conspiracy theories, millenarianism, stigmatized knowledge
T he importance of the motif of ‘‘conspiracy theories’’ in contem-porary popular discourse has become clear in recent decades,and particularly since the beginning of the new millennium.
Of course, there have always been conspiracies in the legal sense, and
certainly grand narratives of one-or-other group (be that the Jews, the
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Illuminati, the Jesuits, or the Freemasons) acting as a ‘‘hidden hand’’
manipulating political events from behind the curtain have existed since
at least the seventeenth century.1 During the early Cold War, the con-
spiracy narrative that Communists were attempting covertly to under-
mine the United States was a pervasive and accepted part of political
discourse, and indeed, Katherine Olmsted argues that the contempo-
rary popularity of conspiracy theory narratives was a direct result of this
tendency to posit conspiracies plotting against the United States.2
During the 1960s, however, and particularly following the assassination
of John F. Kennedy in 1963, consensus politicians who were concerned
about their power to mobilize discontented minorities, as well as influ-
enced by their own elitism, increasingly stigmatized such grand conspir-
acy narratives.3 Thus the conspiracy theory as we know it today emerged,
filling the vacuum left by the end of the Cold War.4
Developments in communications technology—including the avail-
ability of AM radio, 24-hour ‘‘rolling’’ television news and the Internet—
meant that events such as 1993’s siege of the Branch Davidian compound
in Waco, Texas, 1995’s Oklahoma City bombing, and the 9–11 attacks of
2001 were broadcast as they happened (including whatever changes
there were to the ‘‘official line’’), and came under intense scrutiny out-
side official channels. Although conspiracy theory narratives are popu-
larly regarded as taking place within a politically and religiously
conservative context, recent studies have suggested significant audiences
amongst working class and ethnic minorities, particularly black
Americans,5 as well as the political left.6 At the time of writing, conspira-
cist narratives concerning the Jade Helmmilitary exercises in Texas, and
in the United Kingdom, Operation Yewtree’s investigation into historic
child abuse by Members of Parliament (among others), are common-
place beyond the alternative press. Moreover, conspiracist narratives
have become an inescapable feature of popular entertainment media.7
Academic researchers have only recently begun to treat conspiracy
theory narratives as a subject worthy of serious attention, however.
Historical, ethnographic, and more recently psychological studies have
begun to address this complex field, with the first international confer-
ence on the subject taking place at the University of Miami in April 2015.
This special issue of Nova Religio is intended to introduce and establish
the significance of the topic for researchers in the field of new, alterna-
tive, and emergent religious formations.
The term ‘‘conspiracy theory’’ first appears in philosopher of science
Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, in which he outlines
what he calls the ‘‘conspiracy theory of society.’’ He describes conspiracy
theories as a ‘‘result of the secularisation of religious superstition,’’ with
the gods replaced by ‘‘the Learned Elders of Zion, or the monopolists, or
the capitalists.’’8 So, as Asbjorn Dyrendal notes, the connection to religion
was there from the start.9 Popular use of the term, however, originates
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with a CIA document outlining how to deal with criticisms of the Warren
Commission’s investigation into the assassination of John Kennedy in
Dallas, 1963.10 This rhetorical function is seen clearly repeated in
Richard Hofstadter’s The Paranoid Style in American Politics (1965),11 and
the tradition of scholarship that followed his work.12 From this position,
belief in conspiracy theories indicates pathology—either paranoia, or
simply stupidity, as clearly indicated in Fredric Jameson’s description of
conspiracy theories as ‘‘the poor man’s cognitive mapping.’’13 The elitist
implication in the Marxist Jameson’s work is not, I would suggest,
coincidental.
As I have discussed at length elsewhere, conspiracy theories cannot
be substantively defined14—that is, there is nothing specific that can
make something once and forever a conspiracy theory. Indeed, many
now-accepted explanations of historical events have at one time been
considered conspiracy theories, the Watergate scandal being a clear
example. Nor does it refer to any theory that posits a conspiracy, or
we would be forced to consider al Qaida’s organization of the 9–11
attacks a conspiracy theory. Rather, the term has a polemical function,
operating as ‘‘an excuse for neglecting, equating and even repressing
political protest of all sorts.’’15
For Michael Barkun, such claims constitute ‘‘stigmatized knowledge,’’
explanations which challenge the epistemic authorities, including knowl-
edge that has been forgotten, that which has been superseded, ignored,
rejected, or most pertinently, suppressed.16 Barkun’s A Culture of
Conspiracy (2003), a historiography of the adoption of UFO-related con-
spiracy narratives among right-wing millennial Christians in the United
States to form a milieu which Barkun names ‘‘improvisational millennial-
ism,’’17 was particularly important in that it established a terminology for
the academic discussion of such topics. Recognizing the problems with
the term conspiracy theory, Barkun suggests that we instead talk of ‘‘con-
spiracy beliefs’’—that is, a specific claim that ‘‘an organization made up of
individuals or groups has or is acting covertly to achieve some malevolent
end’’18—and ‘‘conspiracism,’’ referring to a weltanshauung based on
a number of conspiracy beliefs, and a propensity to see conspiracies as
the major motivating force in history.19 However, I have concerns about
the accuracy of ‘‘beliefs’’ in this context, as subscribers may only partially
or even playfully utilize these ideas, so I refer instead to ‘‘conspiracy
narratives,’’ which has the added benefit of not making distinctions
between proven and unproven theories.
Uncritical use of loaded categories continues to blight research in
this field, however. Psychological studies, in particular, tend to reinforce
the assumption that conspiracy beliefs equals erroneous thinking by using
standardized questionnaires that reduce beliefs to simple binary options
that ignore the exploratory and narrative function such ideas may also
have.20 Moreover, such surveys do not typically take into consideration
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that many—probably themajority—hold beliefs concerning hidden agen-
cies which are not considered to challenge the epistemic norms of their
culture, including religions, paranormal ideas such as ghosts or UFOs,
and perhaps even such ideological norms as human rights or the free
market.21 However, even supposedly critical accounts of conspiracy theo-
ries will include comments as to how the thinking of those who subscribe
to conspiracy narratives may be corrected.22
The relevance of conspiracy theory narratives to the study of reli-
gions, although frequently noted,23 has only recently come under sus-
tained academic attention. As the field develops, however, three distinct
approaches have emerged. Firstly, historical and/or anthropological
studies examine how certain religious groups have been the subject of
conspiracy narratives by the wider culture—what we might describe as
conspiracy narratives about religion(s). Very often, these narratives actu-
ally construct religions which embody the opposite of what is taken to be
morally good. Examples include narratives concerning witches in
Europe, the United States,24 and post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa.25
A more modern version of this narrative can be identified in the
Satanic Ritual Abuse panic of the United States and the United
Kingdom during the 1980s and mid-1990s, in which organized groups
of ‘‘Satanists’’ were alleged to be abducting and abusing children and
adults on a massive scale,26 and which continues to flare up from time
to time.27 Right-wing conspiracists in the United States often describe
politicians and other elites as secretly members of a ‘‘Luciferian’’ reli-
gion, and taking part in occult rites at sites such as Bohemian Grove.28 In
other cases, an existing religion or other group is scapegoated, such as in
the case of the anti-Semitic conspiracy narratives behind the creation of
the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.29 David Redles argues convinc-
ingly for viewing the Nazi regime as a messianic millenarian movement,
in which the Protocols provided ‘‘both an explanation for the world’s
impending apocalypse, as well as a plan of action.’’30 Sadly, the
Protocols continue to have an alarming degree of influence in the mod-
ern world, particularly in Islamic countries.31 Processes of Othering
come into sharp focus in these cases, with conspiracy narratives con-
structing group identity by distinguishing ‘‘us’’ from ‘‘them’’ along moral
and ideological lines.
We can also examine conspiracy narratives in religion(s), examining
how conspiracy narratives are mobilized within specific religious
groups. Charlotte Ward and David Voas introduced the subject of con-
spiracy theories in the New Age milieu.32 Focusing on popular culture
and the Internet, they argue that ‘‘the world-affirming, cultic ‘New
Age’ and the world-rejecting, sectarian conspiracy milieu have merged
into a world-accommodating—arguablymainstream—hybrid.’’33 The pos-
iting of a conspiracy to prevent the arrival of theNewAge provided a ready
explanation for the prophetic failure of the New Age to arrive.34
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Conspiracy theories have also been examined in new religious move-
ments, including Aum Shinrikyo,35 the Nuwaubians,36 Neopaganism37
and Scientology.38 Problematically however, these descriptions, although
rich, have almost universally focused upon marginal groups viewed as
extremist and whose actions have, in many cases, led to violence. This is
to belie that such mechanisms take place within more ‘‘mainstream’’
religious traditions also.
A third and particularly interesting approach is to examine conspir-
acy narratives as religion, that is, as a way of thinking or acting with
commonalities to religious thought and behaviors, such as theodicy,
millennialism and esoteric claims to higher knowledge. Making the
comparison with Antoine Faivre’s influential definition of Esotericism,39
Asbjorn Dyrendal draws out ‘‘the parallel ways in which knowledge,
history, and agency are constructed’’ in these two discourses.40 Both rely
on special (and stigmatized) knowledge, yet in both cases can lead to
a revelation—or gnosis—which transforms the individual. Brian Keeley,
on the other hand, argues that the epistemological similarity between
religious and conspiracist narratives is that they posit non-falsifiable
agencies behind evident events. Evidence presented against the exis-
tence of this occluded agent is interpreted as evidence of an attempt
to conceal it, which has the effect of rendering the belief non-falsifiable.
He argues that in religious and conspiracist narratives ‘‘absence of evi-
dence is not evidence of absence.’’41
Inverting this, I have analyzed the use of prophecy in traditional
right-wing conspiracist discourse, focusing on the influential Texas-
based radio host and filmmaker, Alex Jones. My essay, ‘‘(Always)
Living in the End Times: The Rolling Prophecy of the Conspiracist
Milieu,’’ introduces the idea of ‘‘rolling prophecy,’’ where small proph-
ecies are made on a regular and ongoing basis, albeit tied to a broader
millennial narrative. Most of Jones’ predictions are unsuccessful, but
those are quietly dropped while the few successful elements are repeat-
edly emphasized. Over time, the impression of successful prophecy is
established, allowing Jones to increase his epistemic capital.42
In short, the study of religion and conspiracy theories is developing
into a distinct sub-field, demonstrated by an increasing tendency for
textbooks and anthologies to include chapters on the topic.43 It is there-
fore exciting to be introducing in this issue of Nova Religio the first
published volume dedicated solely to the subject. The articles gathered
together here are drawn primarily from the two conference panels on
the subject I organized, the first at the 2012 British Sociological
Association, Sociology of Religion group (SOCREL) conference, in
Chester, and the second at the European Association for the Study of
Religion conference, at Liverpool in 2013.44 It is designed to be at the
same time a general introduction to the (sub)field, and to complement
twoother forthcomingpublications:myownmore specializedmonograph,
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UFOs, Conspiracy Theories and the New Age: Millennial Conspiracism (2016),45
and themoreencyclopedicHandbook of Conspiracy Theories andContemporary
Religion (forthcoming), edited by Egil Asprem, Asbjorn Dyrendal, and
David G. Robertson.46 Here in this special issue of Nova Religio, the focus
is on the contemporary alternative religious milieu, and the articles have
been selected to reflect intersections of conspiracy theories with the alter-
native and emergent religions that Nova Religio examines. The articles
gathered together here add considerably to the ethnographic and, partic-
ularly, historical research on this subject. Too often, new religions and
conspiracism both are considered as though having sprung into existence
in the modern world fully formed. Yet as these articles demonstrate, they
have identifiable historical roots that, moreover, are not easily separated
into ‘‘religious’’ and ‘‘non-religious’’ strands. The cultural context of the
development of ‘‘new and alternative religions’’ and ‘‘conspiracy theories’’
is complex, but interrelated; in particular, the issue of detraditionalization
is highlighted in these articles, the questioning of all authorities of tradi-
tion, experience and—importantly—epistemology.
The articles are also chosen to cover what I have described as the
important ‘‘discursive units’’ of the field;47 that is, the topics that cross
between these fields and enable the transfer of ideas between them. For
example, an individual with an interest in UFOs is every bit as likely to
come into contact with Illuminati conspiracist narratives through Jim
Marrs’ Alien Agenda (1997) or Milton William Cooper’s Behold a Pale
Horse (1991) as they are to come to New Age ideas through Ken
Carey’s Starseed Transmissions (1991) or David Wilcock’s The Source Field
Investigations (2011).48 Other significant discursive units are alternative
health (addressed in this journal by Beth Singler and David Robertson);
millennialism (addressed by Kevin Whitesides); alternative histories
(addressed by Spencer Dew); and ‘‘gnosis,’’ special knowledge that is
both salvational and transforms the individual’s understanding of their
place in the cosmos. As is often quoted, ‘‘the truth shall set you free’’
(John 8:32).
The first two articles are case studies examining specific discourses
within the cultic milieu49 where conspiracist narratives and religious
discourses are found together. In the first, Beth Singler shows how the
New Age concept of ‘‘Indigo Children’’ (that is, a generation of children
who are supposedly being born at a higher level of spiritual development
from their parents) feeds into a conspiracy narrative concerning ‘‘Big
Pharma,’’ wherein the palliative aspects of mainstream medicine are
subsumed under a commercial imperative to create illnesses and syn-
dromes in order to sell treatments. She argues that changes in infant
mortality and working patterns have placed greater focus on parenting
as a ‘‘project,’’ and therefore greater emphasis on finding the cause of
problems that interfere with it. This article highlights the heuristic func-
tion of both conspiracist and religious ideas, and asserts that rather than
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being irrational and paranoid, these narratives are rational, in as much
as they make logical sense of the data that their subscribers have.
The subject of Kevin Whitesides’ article is 2012 millennialism.
He argues that the 2012 millennial narrative originated in a New Age
context but was transmitted into the conspiracist milieu. The article
describes this discursive transfer in detail, and addresses the issue of why
conspiracist and New Age discourses frequently overlap. As Whiteside
puts it, his intent is ‘‘to closely assess the ways in which the various
alternatives that make up the informational basis of the cultic milieu
tend to cluster together in some areas more than others.’’
As Whitesides notes, this cross-fertilization is driven by a mutual dis-
trust of ‘‘the mainstream,’’ which is to say, any institutionalized authority
(excepting the odd case where a scientific paper agrees with their con-
clusions). Whitesides’ article is also of particular interest in the ongoing
debate about the definition of New Age; despite Wouter J. Hanegraaff’s
and Steven J. Sutcliffe’s claims to the contrary,50 millennialism is alive and
well in the cultic milieu. ‘‘New Age’’ has not changed from sensu strictu (in
a strict sense) to senso lato (in a late sense, implying broader and less
millennial); rather, ‘‘2012’’ is simply the latest in a long line of millennial
tropes within the cultic milieu, of which New Age (and Ascension, Earth
Changes, the return of the Christ Spirit) were forerunners.
Carole Cusack’s article concerns The Church of the SubGenius, an
‘‘invented religion’’ (to use the terminology from her 2012 book).51 She
argues that it offers a sophisticated critique of Western values focused on
resistance to consumerist society, described as a conspiracy. However,
SubGenii also fully embrace the consumerist ‘‘society of the spectacle’’
(to borrow from Guy Debord), offering ‘‘eternal life or triple your money
back!’’ Cusack’s argument is that appreciating both levels at once in all
their apparent contradiction is the key to SubGenius ‘‘enSlackenment.’’
As well as a welcome examination of how one particularly modern reli-
gious formation engages with conspiracy narratives, Cusack’s chapter is an
important treatment in that it points out that while conspiracy narratives
may be treated playfully, this playfulness is an expression of a generalized
distrust of the social and epistemic norms of contemporary society, and
thus an act of resistance in itself.
The focus on new religions continues in Spencer Dew’s article on the
Washitaw de Dugdamoundyah. The African American members of this
movement claim to be the true legal heirs to the land annexed by the
United States in the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, having settled there
from Muumuu in the time of Moses. Their foundational text, Return of
the Ancient Ones (1993), by the founder, Empress Verdiacee ‘‘Tiara’’
Washitaw-Turner Goston El-Bey of the Ancient Ones (1927–2014), uti-
lizes language from biblical, Islamic, and Native American traditions
within an extended disputation with the legality of the Louisiana
Purchase, and is therefore at once a religious and a legal text, albeit one
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which is at odds with accepted facts. This mobilization of ‘‘counterfac-
tual’’ legal discourse is found among other new and emergent religious
groups, as well as conspiracist groups, notably the Sovereign Citizen or
Freemen movement,52 and might be usefully considered a de´tournement
of the discourse of the elites back against them. For the Washitaw, estab-
lished history is a lie, part of a conspiracy by White elites to rob Blacks of
their land and rights. Nevertheless, ‘‘[t]he truth will set you free.’’
Finally, the special issue reaches the fringes of the mainstream with
this author’s article on the material study of millennialist ideas in right-
wing conspiracism in the United States, here focusing particularly on the
work of Texas-based independent broadcaster Alex Jones (b. 1974). The
article analyses how Jones’ millennial conspiracist narrative is constructed
from mundane things, and in turn nurtures material economies that
reflect the concerns of his audience. Despite acknowledging the problems
inherent in the material approach—specifically that it encourages an
essentialist ‘‘phenomenology-by-stealth’’—the article argues that by focus-
ing on the economies surrounding millennial conspiracist narratives,
scholars might be able to avoid reducing such narratives to ‘‘aberrant
beliefs,’’ which are constructed as both inherently novel and detached
from the broader episteme.
The importance of the study of conspiracy theory narratives is that
they are a microcosm of broader cultural trends in the interplay of knowl-
edge and power, both within religious groups, and between them and the
broader culture. As Stef Aupers notes, conspiracy theories are ‘‘a radical
and generalised manifestation of distrust that is deeply embedded in the
cultural logic of modernity,’’53 and I have described conspiracism as
a ‘‘counter-epistemology’’ based on a broader set of epistemological strat-
egies than are accepted by societal institutions. However, value judgments
about what is sane, rational, ‘‘true,’’ or otherwise should have no place in
the study of cultural meaning, and this is a strong reason to consider
conspiracy theories from a religious studies perspective. In theory at least,
religious studies scholars are specialists at ‘‘bracketing’’ truth claims (their
own and those of others) while studying religious beliefs and practice, and
therefore this issue contains no attempts to evaluate the truth or otherwise
of particular conspiracy theories. After all, if belief in a ‘‘hidden hand’’
makes one irrational or delusional, what does this say about the approx-
imately 70 percent of Americans who profess to believe in God?54 This
may make some readers uncomfortable. If so, I will have demonstrated
why this field warrants further investigation. Until now, the academic
study of ‘‘conspiracy theories,’’ with its emphasis on deviancy, irrationality,
and potential violence, mirrors earlier studies of new religious move-
ments; similarly, fair and objective study will likely show that the only new
thing about them is their visibility. Both cases demonstrate that if scholars
are only willing to consider elite narratives as worthy of consideration,
then we are not questioning power structures, but reproducing them.
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